Wait a minute! A fast, Cross-VM attack on AES

Gorka Irazoqui; Mehmet Sinan Inci; Thomas Eisenbarth; Berk Sunar

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-11379-1_15

Wait a minute! A fast, Cross-VM attack on AES

Gorka Irazoqui, Mehmet Sinan Inci, Thomas Eisenbarth, Berk Sunar

Institute of IT Security

203 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In cloud computing, efficiencies are reaped by resource sharing such as co-location of computation and deduplication of data. This work exploits resource sharing in virtualization software to build a powerful cache-based attack on AES. We demonstrate the vulnerability by mounting Cross-VM Flush+Reload cache attacks in VMware VMs to recover the keys of an AES implementation of OpenSSL 1.0.1 running inside the victim VM. Furthermore, the attack works in a realistic setting where different VMs are located on separate cores. The modified flush+reload attack we present, takes only in the order of seconds to minutes to succeed in a cross-VM setting. Therefore long term co-location, as required by other fine grain attacks in the literature, are not needed. The results of this study show that there is a great security risk to OpenSSL AES implementation running on VMware cloud services when the deduplication is not disabled.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses
Editors	Angelos Stavrou, Herbert Bos, Georgios Portokalidis
Number of pages	21
Volume	8688
Publisher	Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Publication date	09.2014
Pages	299-319
ISBN (Print)	978-3-319-11378-4
ISBN (Electronic)	978-3-319-11379-1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-11379-1_15
Publication status	Published - 09.2014
Event	17th International Workshop on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection - Gothenburg, Sweden Duration: 17.09.2014 → 19.09.2014

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10.1007/978-3-319-11379-1_15

https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/435

Cite this

@inproceedings{c4abde605933403694b88256946210cf,

title = "Wait a minute! A fast, Cross-VM attack on AES",

abstract = "In cloud computing, efficiencies are reaped by resource sharing such as co-location of computation and deduplication of data. This work exploits resource sharing in virtualization software to build a powerful cache-based attack on AES. We demonstrate the vulnerability by mounting Cross-VM Flush+Reload cache attacks in VMware VMs to recover the keys of an AES implementation of OpenSSL 1.0.1 running inside the victim VM. Furthermore, the attack works in a realistic setting where different VMs are located on separate cores. The modified flush+reload attack we present, takes only in the order of seconds to minutes to succeed in a cross-VM setting. Therefore long term co-location, as required by other fine grain attacks in the literature, are not needed. The results of this study show that there is a great security risk to OpenSSL AES implementation running on VMware cloud services when the deduplication is not disabled.",

author = "Gorka Irazoqui and Inci, \{Mehmet Sinan\} and Thomas Eisenbarth and Berk Sunar",

year = "2014",

month = sep,

doi = "10.1007/978-3-319-11379-1\_15",

language = "English",

isbn = "978-3-319-11378-4",

volume = "8688",

series = "Lecture Notes in Computer Science",

publisher = "Springer Berlin Heidelberg",

pages = "299--319",

editor = "Stavrou, \{Angelos \} and Bos, \{Herbert \} and Portokalidis, \{Georgios \}",

booktitle = "Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses",

note = "17th International Workshop on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection, RAID 2014 ; Conference date: 17-09-2014 Through 19-09-2014",

}

Irazoqui, G, Inci, MS, Eisenbarth, T & Sunar, B 2014, Wait a minute! A fast, Cross-VM attack on AES. in A Stavrou, H Bos & G Portokalidis (eds), Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses. vol. 8688, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 8688, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, pp. 299-319, 17th International Workshop on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection, Gothenburg, Sweden, 17.09.14. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-11379-1_15

Wait a minute! A fast, Cross-VM attack on AES. / Irazoqui, Gorka; Inci, Mehmet Sinan; Eisenbarth, Thomas et al.
Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses. ed. / Angelos Stavrou; Herbert Bos; Georgios Portokalidis. Vol. 8688 Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2014. p. 299-319 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science; Vol. 8688).

Research output: Chapters in Books/Reports/Conference Proceedings › Conference contribution › peer-review

TY - GEN

T1 - Wait a minute! A fast, Cross-VM attack on AES

AU - Irazoqui, Gorka

AU - Inci, Mehmet Sinan

AU - Eisenbarth, Thomas

AU - Sunar, Berk

PY - 2014/9

Y1 - 2014/9

N2 - In cloud computing, efficiencies are reaped by resource sharing such as co-location of computation and deduplication of data. This work exploits resource sharing in virtualization software to build a powerful cache-based attack on AES. We demonstrate the vulnerability by mounting Cross-VM Flush+Reload cache attacks in VMware VMs to recover the keys of an AES implementation of OpenSSL 1.0.1 running inside the victim VM. Furthermore, the attack works in a realistic setting where different VMs are located on separate cores. The modified flush+reload attack we present, takes only in the order of seconds to minutes to succeed in a cross-VM setting. Therefore long term co-location, as required by other fine grain attacks in the literature, are not needed. The results of this study show that there is a great security risk to OpenSSL AES implementation running on VMware cloud services when the deduplication is not disabled.

AB - In cloud computing, efficiencies are reaped by resource sharing such as co-location of computation and deduplication of data. This work exploits resource sharing in virtualization software to build a powerful cache-based attack on AES. We demonstrate the vulnerability by mounting Cross-VM Flush+Reload cache attacks in VMware VMs to recover the keys of an AES implementation of OpenSSL 1.0.1 running inside the victim VM. Furthermore, the attack works in a realistic setting where different VMs are located on separate cores. The modified flush+reload attack we present, takes only in the order of seconds to minutes to succeed in a cross-VM setting. Therefore long term co-location, as required by other fine grain attacks in the literature, are not needed. The results of this study show that there is a great security risk to OpenSSL AES implementation running on VMware cloud services when the deduplication is not disabled.

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-319-11379-1_15

DO - 10.1007/978-3-319-11379-1_15

M3 - Conference contribution

SN - 978-3-319-11378-4

VL - 8688

T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science

SP - 299

EP - 319

BT - Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses

A2 - Stavrou, Angelos

A2 - Bos, Herbert

A2 - Portokalidis, Georgios

PB - Springer Berlin Heidelberg

T2 - 17th International Workshop on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection

Y2 - 17 September 2014 through 19 September 2014

ER -

Wait a minute! A fast, Cross-VM attack on AES

Abstract

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