TY - JOUR
T1 - Three Roles of Empirical Information in Philosophy: Intuitions on Mathematics do Not Come for Free
AU - Kant, D.
AU - Pérez-Escobar, J.A.
AU - Sarikaya, D.
N1 - Funding Information: Acknowledgements: The first author is thankful for the financial support within the Forcing Project by the Volkswagen Foundation. The third author is thankful for the financial and ideal support of the Studienstiftung des deutschen Volkes and the Claussen-Simon-Stiftung. All authors are very thankful for the advice and helpful comments by D. A. King, S. Nagler, H. Pillin, and R. Wagner and the financial aid to cover the OA-fees by the University of Konstanz. The views stated here are not necessarily the views of the supporting organizations and people mentioned in this acknowledgement. Research funding: This work was funded by Volkswagen Foundation (Forcing Project), Studienstiftung des Deutschen Volkes, and Claussen-Simon-Stiftung. Publisher Copyright: © 2021 Deborah Kant et al., published by De Gruyter. Copyright: Copyright 2022 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2021
Y1 - 2021
N2 - This work gives a new argument for ‘Empirical Philosophy of Mathematical Practice’. It analyses different modalities on how empirical information can influence philosophical endeavours. We evoke the classical dichotomy between “armchair” philosophy and empirical/experimental philosophy, and claim that the latter should in turn be subdivided in three distinct styles: Apostate speculator, Informed analyst, and Freeway explorer. This is a shift of focus from the source of the information towards its use by philosophers. We present several examples from philosophy of mind/science and ethics on one side and a case study from philosophy of mathematics on the other. We argue that empirically informed philosophy of mathematics is different from the rest in a way that encourages a Freeway explorer approach, because intuitions about mathematical objects are often unavailable for non-mathematicians (since they are sometimes hard to grasp even for mathematicians). This consideration is supported by a case study in set theory.
AB - This work gives a new argument for ‘Empirical Philosophy of Mathematical Practice’. It analyses different modalities on how empirical information can influence philosophical endeavours. We evoke the classical dichotomy between “armchair” philosophy and empirical/experimental philosophy, and claim that the latter should in turn be subdivided in three distinct styles: Apostate speculator, Informed analyst, and Freeway explorer. This is a shift of focus from the source of the information towards its use by philosophers. We present several examples from philosophy of mind/science and ethics on one side and a case study from philosophy of mathematics on the other. We argue that empirically informed philosophy of mathematics is different from the rest in a way that encourages a Freeway explorer approach, because intuitions about mathematical objects are often unavailable for non-mathematicians (since they are sometimes hard to grasp even for mathematicians). This consideration is supported by a case study in set theory.
U2 - 10.1515/KRT-2021-0025
DO - 10.1515/KRT-2021-0025
M3 - Zeitschriftenaufsätze
SN - 2750-977X
VL - 35
SP - 247
EP - 278
JO - KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy
JF - KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy
IS - 3
ER -
