Abstract
For a long time the dominant view on the nature of blame was that to blame someone is to have an emotion toward her, such as anger, resentment or indignation in the case of blaming someone else and guilt in the case of self-blame. Even though this view is still widely held, it has recently come under heavy attack. The aim of this paper is to elaborate the idea that to blame is to have an emotion and to defend the resulting emotion account of blame.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Journal | Philosophical Studies |
| Volume | 174 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| Pages (from-to) | 257-273 |
| Number of pages | 17 |
| ISSN | 0031-8116 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 01.01.2017 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Funding
For comments on earlier versions of this paper, I am grateful to Anne Burkard, Daniele Bruno, Claire Davis, Jan Gertken, Sukaina Hirji, Benjamin Kiesewetter, Felix Koch, Eduardo Rivera-L??pez, Andreas M??ller, Thomas Schmidt, and the participants of the colloquia for practical philosophy and ethics at Humboldt-Universit??t zu Berlin 09/2012 and 01/2016 and of the 2nd Humboldt-Princeton Graduate Conference in Philosophy 08/2012. Special thanks go to Hannah Altehenger and Simon Gaus who commented on numerous versions of the paper. Finally, I thank an anonymous referee for comments that improved the paper significantly.??Work on this paper has been supported by the Studienstiftung des deutschen Volkes.