Masking Large Keys in Hardware: A Masked Implementation of McEliece

Cong  Chen; Thomas Eisenbarth; Ingo Von Maurich; Rainer  Steinwandt

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-31301-6_18

Masking Large Keys in Hardware: A Masked Implementation of McEliece

Cong Chen, Thomas Eisenbarth, Ingo Von Maurich, Rainer Steinwandt

Institute of IT-Security

Abstract

Instantiations of the McEliece cryptosystem which are considered computationally secure even in a post-quantum era still require hardening against side channel attacks for practical applications. Recently, the first differential power analysis attack on a McEliece cryptosystem successfully recovered the full secret key of a state-of-the-art FPGA implementation of QC-MDPC McEliece. In this work we show how to apply masking countermeasures to the scheme and present the first masked FPGA implementation that includes these countermeasures. We validate the side channel resistance of our design by practical DPA attacks and statistical tests for leakage detection.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Selected Areas in Cryptography - SAC 2015
Number of pages	17
Volume	9566
Publisher	Springer Verlag
Publication date	08.2015
Pages	293-309
ISBN (Print)	978-3-319-31300-9
ISBN (Electronic)	978-3-319-31301-6
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31301-6_18
Publication status	Published - 08.2015
Event	22th International Conference on Selected Areas in Cryptography - Sackville, Canada Duration: 12.08.2015 → 14.08.2015

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title = "Masking Large Keys in Hardware: A Masked Implementation of McEliece",

abstract = "Instantiations of the McEliece cryptosystem which are considered computationally secure even in a post-quantum era still require hardening against side channel attacks for practical applications. Recently, the first differential power analysis attack on a McEliece cryptosystem successfully recovered the full secret key of a state-of-the-art FPGA implementation of QC-MDPC McEliece. In this work we show how to apply masking countermeasures to the scheme and present the first masked FPGA implementation that includes these countermeasures. We validate the side channel resistance of our design by practical DPA attacks and statistical tests for leakage detection.",

author = "Cong Chen and Thomas Eisenbarth and {Von Maurich}, Ingo and Rainer Steinwandt",

year = "2015",

month = aug,

doi = "10.1007/978-3-319-31301-6_18",

language = "English",

isbn = "978-3-319-31300-9",

volume = "9566",

series = "Lecture Notes in Computer Science",

publisher = "Springer Verlag",

pages = "293--309",

booktitle = "Selected Areas in Cryptography - SAC 2015",

note = "22th International Conference on Selected Areas in Cryptography, SAC 2015 ; Conference date: 12-08-2015 Through 14-08-2015",

}

Chen, C, Eisenbarth, T, Von Maurich, I & Steinwandt, R 2015, Masking Large Keys in Hardware: A Masked Implementation of McEliece. in Selected Areas in Cryptography - SAC 2015 . vol. 9566, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 9566, Springer Verlag, pp. 293-309, 22th International Conference on Selected Areas in Cryptography, Sackville, Canada, 12.08.15. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31301-6_18

Masking Large Keys in Hardware: A Masked Implementation of McEliece. / Chen, Cong ; Eisenbarth, Thomas; Von Maurich, Ingo et al.
Selected Areas in Cryptography - SAC 2015 . Vol. 9566 Springer Verlag, 2015. p. 293-309 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science; Vol. 9566).

Research output: Chapters in Books/Reports/Conference Proceedings › Conference contribution › peer-review

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AU - Von Maurich, Ingo

AU - Steinwandt, Rainer

PY - 2015/8

Y1 - 2015/8

N2 - Instantiations of the McEliece cryptosystem which are considered computationally secure even in a post-quantum era still require hardening against side channel attacks for practical applications. Recently, the first differential power analysis attack on a McEliece cryptosystem successfully recovered the full secret key of a state-of-the-art FPGA implementation of QC-MDPC McEliece. In this work we show how to apply masking countermeasures to the scheme and present the first masked FPGA implementation that includes these countermeasures. We validate the side channel resistance of our design by practical DPA attacks and statistical tests for leakage detection.

AB - Instantiations of the McEliece cryptosystem which are considered computationally secure even in a post-quantum era still require hardening against side channel attacks for practical applications. Recently, the first differential power analysis attack on a McEliece cryptosystem successfully recovered the full secret key of a state-of-the-art FPGA implementation of QC-MDPC McEliece. In this work we show how to apply masking countermeasures to the scheme and present the first masked FPGA implementation that includes these countermeasures. We validate the side channel resistance of our design by practical DPA attacks and statistical tests for leakage detection.

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DO - 10.1007/978-3-319-31301-6_18

M3 - Conference contribution

SN - 978-3-319-31300-9

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T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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EP - 309

BT - Selected Areas in Cryptography - SAC 2015

PB - Springer Verlag

T2 - 22th International Conference on Selected Areas in Cryptography

Y2 - 12 August 2015 through 14 August 2015

ER -

Masking Large Keys in Hardware: A Masked Implementation of McEliece

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