Horizontal and Vertical Side Channel Analysis of a McEliece Cryptosystem

Cong Chen; Thomas Eisenbarth; Rainer Steinwandt; Ingo Von Maurich

doi:10.1109/TIFS.2015.2509944

Horizontal and Vertical Side Channel Analysis of a McEliece Cryptosystem

Cong Chen, Thomas Eisenbarth, Rainer Steinwandt, Ingo Von Maurich

Institute of IT-Security

18 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper presents horizontal and vertical side channel analysis techniques for an implementation of the McEliece cryptosystem. The target of this side-channel attack is a state-of-the-art field-programmable gate array (FPGA) implementation of the efficient quasi-cyclic moderate-density parity-check McEliece decryption operation, as presented at Design, Automation and Test in Europe (DATE) 2014. The presented cryptanalysis succeeds to recover the complete secret key after a few observed decryptions. It consists of a combination of a differential leakage analysis during the syndrome computation followed by an algebraic step that exploits the relation between the public key and the private key.

Original language	English
Journal	IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Volume	11
Issue number	6
Pages (from-to)	1093-1105
Number of pages	13
ISSN	1556-6013
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/TIFS.2015.2509944
Publication status	Published - 06.2016

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title = "Horizontal and Vertical Side Channel Analysis of a McEliece Cryptosystem",

abstract = "This paper presents horizontal and vertical side channel analysis techniques for an implementation of the McEliece cryptosystem. The target of this side-channel attack is a state-of-the-art field-programmable gate array (FPGA) implementation of the efficient quasi-cyclic moderate-density parity-check McEliece decryption operation, as presented at Design, Automation and Test in Europe (DATE) 2014. The presented cryptanalysis succeeds to recover the complete secret key after a few observed decryptions. It consists of a combination of a differential leakage analysis during the syndrome computation followed by an algebraic step that exploits the relation between the public key and the private key.",

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AU - Von Maurich, Ingo

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N2 - This paper presents horizontal and vertical side channel analysis techniques for an implementation of the McEliece cryptosystem. The target of this side-channel attack is a state-of-the-art field-programmable gate array (FPGA) implementation of the efficient quasi-cyclic moderate-density parity-check McEliece decryption operation, as presented at Design, Automation and Test in Europe (DATE) 2014. The presented cryptanalysis succeeds to recover the complete secret key after a few observed decryptions. It consists of a combination of a differential leakage analysis during the syndrome computation followed by an algebraic step that exploits the relation between the public key and the private key.

AB - This paper presents horizontal and vertical side channel analysis techniques for an implementation of the McEliece cryptosystem. The target of this side-channel attack is a state-of-the-art field-programmable gate array (FPGA) implementation of the efficient quasi-cyclic moderate-density parity-check McEliece decryption operation, as presented at Design, Automation and Test in Europe (DATE) 2014. The presented cryptanalysis succeeds to recover the complete secret key after a few observed decryptions. It consists of a combination of a differential leakage analysis during the syndrome computation followed by an algebraic step that exploits the relation between the public key and the private key.

UR - https://www.researchgate.net/publication/291019314_Horizontal_and_Vertical_Side_Channel_Analysis_of_a_McEliece_Cryptosystem

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JO - IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security

JF - IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security

IS - 6

ER -

Horizontal and Vertical Side Channel Analysis of a McEliece Cryptosystem

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