Grounding responsibility in appropriate blame

Leonhard Menges*

*Corresponding author for this work

Abstract

When confronted with the question of why it is appropriate to morally blame a person for some bad action, it may seem plausible to reply that she is morally responsible for it. Some authors, inspired by Peter Strawson's "Freedom and Resentment," argue, however, that thinking this way is backwards. They believe that a person is morally responsible for some bad action because it would be appropriate to blame her for it. The aims of this paper are to present this account, to highlight some of its important but often overlooked features, and to defend it against pressing objections.

Original languageEnglish
JournalAmerican Philosophical Quarterly
Volume54
Issue number1
Pages (from-to)15-24
Number of pages10
ISSN0003-0481
Publication statusPublished - 01.01.2017
Externally publishedYes

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