Evaluating Resistance of MCML Technology to Power Analysis Attacks Using a Simulation-Based Methodology

Francesco Regazzoni; Thomas Eisenbarth; Axel Poschmann; Johann Großschädl; Frank Gurkaynak; Marco Macchetti; Zeynep Toprak; Laura Pozzi; Christof Paar; Yusuf Leblebici; Paolo Ienne

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-01004-0_13

Evaluating Resistance of MCML Technology to Power Analysis Attacks Using a Simulation-Based Methodology

Francesco Regazzoni, Thomas Eisenbarth, Axel Poschmann, Johann Großschädl, Frank Gurkaynak, Marco Macchetti, Zeynep Toprak, Laura Pozzi, Christof Paar, Yusuf Leblebici, Paolo Ienne

Institute of IT Security

21 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper explores the resistance of MOS Current Mode Logic (MCML) against attacks based on the observation of the power consumption. Circuits implemented in MCML, in fact, have unique characteristics both in terms of power consumption and the dependency of the power profile from the input signal pattern. Therefore, MCML is suitable to protect cryptographic hardware from Differential Power Analysis and similar side-channel attacks.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Transactions on Computational Science IV
Editors	Marina L. Gavrilova, C. J. Kenneth Tan, Edward David Moreno
Number of pages	14
Volume	5430
Place of Publication	Berlin, Heidelberg
Publisher	Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Publication date	2009
Pages	230-243
ISBN (Print)	978-3-642-01003-3
ISBN (Electronic)	978-3-642-01004-0
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-01004-0_13
Publication status	Published - 2009

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10.1007/978-3-642-01004-0_13

https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-642-01004-0_13

Cite this

Regazzoni, F., Eisenbarth, T., Poschmann, A., Großschädl, J., Gurkaynak, F., Macchetti, M., Toprak, Z., Pozzi, L., Paar, C., Leblebici, Y., & Ienne, P. (2009). Evaluating Resistance of MCML Technology to Power Analysis Attacks Using a Simulation-Based Methodology. In M. L. Gavrilova, C. J. K. Tan, & E. D. Moreno (Eds.), Transactions on Computational Science IV (Vol. 5430, pp. 230-243). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science; Vol. 5430). Springer Berlin Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-01004-0_13

Regazzoni, Francesco ; Eisenbarth, Thomas ; Poschmann, Axel et al. / Evaluating Resistance of MCML Technology to Power Analysis Attacks Using a Simulation-Based Methodology. Transactions on Computational Science IV. editor / Marina L. Gavrilova ; C. J. Kenneth Tan ; Edward David Moreno. Vol. 5430 Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2009. pp. 230-243 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science).

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title = "Evaluating Resistance of MCML Technology to Power Analysis Attacks Using a Simulation-Based Methodology",

abstract = "This paper explores the resistance of MOS Current Mode Logic (MCML) against attacks based on the observation of the power consumption. Circuits implemented in MCML, in fact, have unique characteristics both in terms of power consumption and the dependency of the power profile from the input signal pattern. Therefore, MCML is suitable to protect cryptographic hardware from Differential Power Analysis and similar side-channel attacks.",

author = "Francesco Regazzoni and Thomas Eisenbarth and Axel Poschmann and Johann Gro{\ss}sch{\"a}dl and Frank Gurkaynak and Marco Macchetti and Zeynep Toprak and Laura Pozzi and Christof Paar and Yusuf Leblebici and Paolo Ienne",

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doi = "10.1007/978-3-642-01004-0\_13",

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isbn = "978-3-642-01003-3",

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series = "Lecture Notes in Computer Science",

publisher = "Springer Berlin Heidelberg",

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booktitle = "Transactions on Computational Science IV",

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Regazzoni, F, Eisenbarth, T, Poschmann, A, Großschädl, J, Gurkaynak, F, Macchetti, M, Toprak, Z, Pozzi, L, Paar, C, Leblebici, Y & Ienne, P 2009, Evaluating Resistance of MCML Technology to Power Analysis Attacks Using a Simulation-Based Methodology. in ML Gavrilova, CJK Tan & ED Moreno (eds), Transactions on Computational Science IV. vol. 5430, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 5430, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, pp. 230-243. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-01004-0_13

Evaluating Resistance of MCML Technology to Power Analysis Attacks Using a Simulation-Based Methodology. / Regazzoni, Francesco; Eisenbarth, Thomas; Poschmann, Axel et al.
Transactions on Computational Science IV. ed. / Marina L. Gavrilova; C. J. Kenneth Tan; Edward David Moreno. Vol. 5430 Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2009. p. 230-243 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science; Vol. 5430).

Research output: Chapters in Books/Reports/Conference Proceedings › Chapter › peer-review

TY - CHAP

T1 - Evaluating Resistance of MCML Technology to Power Analysis Attacks Using a Simulation-Based Methodology

AU - Regazzoni, Francesco

AU - Eisenbarth, Thomas

AU - Poschmann, Axel

AU - Großschädl, Johann

AU - Gurkaynak, Frank

AU - Macchetti, Marco

AU - Toprak, Zeynep

AU - Pozzi, Laura

AU - Paar, Christof

AU - Leblebici, Yusuf

AU - Ienne, Paolo

PY - 2009

Y1 - 2009

N2 - This paper explores the resistance of MOS Current Mode Logic (MCML) against attacks based on the observation of the power consumption. Circuits implemented in MCML, in fact, have unique characteristics both in terms of power consumption and the dependency of the power profile from the input signal pattern. Therefore, MCML is suitable to protect cryptographic hardware from Differential Power Analysis and similar side-channel attacks.

AB - This paper explores the resistance of MOS Current Mode Logic (MCML) against attacks based on the observation of the power consumption. Circuits implemented in MCML, in fact, have unique characteristics both in terms of power consumption and the dependency of the power profile from the input signal pattern. Therefore, MCML is suitable to protect cryptographic hardware from Differential Power Analysis and similar side-channel attacks.

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-642-01004-0_13

DO - 10.1007/978-3-642-01004-0_13

M3 - Chapter

SN - 978-3-642-01003-3

VL - 5430

T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science

SP - 230

EP - 243

BT - Transactions on Computational Science IV

A2 - Gavrilova, Marina L.

A2 - Tan, C. J. Kenneth

A2 - Moreno, Edward David

PB - Springer Berlin Heidelberg

CY - Berlin, Heidelberg

ER -

Regazzoni F, Eisenbarth T, Poschmann A, Großschädl J, Gurkaynak F, Macchetti M et al. Evaluating Resistance of MCML Technology to Power Analysis Attacks Using a Simulation-Based Methodology. In Gavrilova ML, Tan CJK, Moreno ED, editors, Transactions on Computational Science IV. Vol. 5430. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg. 2009. p. 230-243. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science). doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-01004-0_13

Evaluating Resistance of MCML Technology to Power Analysis Attacks Using a Simulation-Based Methodology

Abstract

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