Differential Power Analysis of a McEliece Cryptosystem

Cong Chen; Thomas Eisenbarth; Rainer Steinwandt; Ingo Von Maurich

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-28166-7_26

Differential Power Analysis of a McEliece Cryptosystem

Cong Chen, Thomas Eisenbarth, Rainer Steinwandt, Ingo Von Maurich

Institute of IT-Security

Abstract

This work presents the first differential power analysis of an implementation of the McEliece cryptosystem. Target of this side-channel attack is a state-of-the-art FPGA implementation of the efficient QC-MDPC McEliece decryption operation as presented at DATE 2014. The presented cryptanalysis succeeds to recover the complete secret key after a few observed decryptions. It consists of a combination of a differential leakage analysis during the syndrome computation followed by an algebraic step that exploits the relation between the public and private key.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Applied Cryptography and Network Security
Editors	Tal Malkin, Vladimir Kolesnikov, Allison Bishop Lewko, Michalis Polychronakis
Number of pages	19
Volume	9092
Publisher	Springer International Publishing
Publication date	09.01.2016
Pages	538-556
ISBN (Print)	978-3-319-28165-0
ISBN (Electronic)	978-3-319-28166-7
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-28166-7_26
Publication status	Published - 09.01.2016
Event	13th International Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security - New York, United States Duration: 02.06.2015 → 05.06.2015

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10.1007/978-3-319-28166-7_26

http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/534

Cite this

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title = "Differential Power Analysis of a McEliece Cryptosystem",

abstract = "This work presents the first differential power analysis of an implementation of the McEliece cryptosystem. Target of this side-channel attack is a state-of-the-art FPGA implementation of the efficient QC-MDPC McEliece decryption operation as presented at DATE 2014. The presented cryptanalysis succeeds to recover the complete secret key after a few observed decryptions. It consists of a combination of a differential leakage analysis during the syndrome computation followed by an algebraic step that exploits the relation between the public and private key.",

author = "Cong Chen and Thomas Eisenbarth and Rainer Steinwandt and {Von Maurich}, Ingo",

year = "2016",

month = jan,

day = "9",

doi = "10.1007/978-3-319-28166-7_26",

language = "English",

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volume = "9092",

pages = "538--556",

editor = "Malkin, {Tal } and Kolesnikov, {Vladimir } and Lewko, {Allison Bishop } and Polychronakis, {Michalis }",

booktitle = "Applied Cryptography and Network Security",

publisher = "Springer International Publishing",

note = "13th International Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security, ACNS 2015 ; Conference date: 02-06-2015 Through 05-06-2015",

}

Chen, C, Eisenbarth, T, Steinwandt, R & Von Maurich, I 2016, Differential Power Analysis of a McEliece Cryptosystem. in T Malkin, V Kolesnikov, AB Lewko & M Polychronakis (eds), Applied Cryptography and Network Security. vol. 9092, Springer International Publishing, pp. 538-556, 13th International Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security, New York, New York, United States, 02.06.15. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-28166-7_26

Differential Power Analysis of a McEliece Cryptosystem. / Chen, Cong; Eisenbarth, Thomas; Steinwandt, Rainer et al.
Applied Cryptography and Network Security. ed. / Tal Malkin; Vladimir Kolesnikov; Allison Bishop Lewko; Michalis Polychronakis. Vol. 9092 Springer International Publishing, 2016. p. 538-556.

Research output: Chapters in Books/Reports/Conference Proceedings › Conference contribution › peer-review

TY - GEN

T1 - Differential Power Analysis of a McEliece Cryptosystem

AU - Chen, Cong

AU - Eisenbarth, Thomas

AU - Steinwandt, Rainer

AU - Von Maurich, Ingo

PY - 2016/1/9

Y1 - 2016/1/9

N2 - This work presents the first differential power analysis of an implementation of the McEliece cryptosystem. Target of this side-channel attack is a state-of-the-art FPGA implementation of the efficient QC-MDPC McEliece decryption operation as presented at DATE 2014. The presented cryptanalysis succeeds to recover the complete secret key after a few observed decryptions. It consists of a combination of a differential leakage analysis during the syndrome computation followed by an algebraic step that exploits the relation between the public and private key.

AB - This work presents the first differential power analysis of an implementation of the McEliece cryptosystem. Target of this side-channel attack is a state-of-the-art FPGA implementation of the efficient QC-MDPC McEliece decryption operation as presented at DATE 2014. The presented cryptanalysis succeeds to recover the complete secret key after a few observed decryptions. It consists of a combination of a differential leakage analysis during the syndrome computation followed by an algebraic step that exploits the relation between the public and private key.

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-319-28166-7_26

DO - 10.1007/978-3-319-28166-7_26

M3 - Conference contribution

SN - 978-3-319-28165-0

VL - 9092

SP - 538

EP - 556

BT - Applied Cryptography and Network Security

A2 - Malkin, Tal

A2 - Kolesnikov, Vladimir

A2 - Lewko, Allison Bishop

A2 - Polychronakis, Michalis

PB - Springer International Publishing

T2 - 13th International Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security

Y2 - 2 June 2015 through 5 June 2015

ER -

Differential Power Analysis of a McEliece Cryptosystem

Abstract

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