Differential Power Analysis of a McEliece Cryptosystem

Cong Chen, Thomas Eisenbarth, Rainer Steinwandt, Ingo Von Maurich


This work presents the first differential power analysis of an implementation of the McEliece cryptosystem. Target of this side-channel attack is a state-of-the-art FPGA implementation of the efficient QC-MDPC McEliece decryption operation as presented at DATE 2014. The presented cryptanalysis succeeds to recover the complete secret key after a few observed decryptions. It consists of a combination of a differential leakage analysis during the syndrome computation followed by an algebraic step that exploits the relation between the public and private key.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationApplied Cryptography and Network Security
EditorsTal Malkin, Vladimir Kolesnikov, Allison Bishop Lewko, Michalis Polychronakis
Number of pages19
PublisherSpringer International Publishing
Publication date09.01.2016
ISBN (Print)978-3-319-28165-0
ISBN (Electronic)978-3-319-28166-7
Publication statusPublished - 09.01.2016
Event13th International Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security - New York, United States
Duration: 02.06.201505.06.2015


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