This work presents the first differential power analysis of an implementation of the McEliece cryptosystem. Target of this side-channel attack is a state-of-the-art FPGA implementation of the efficient QC-MDPC McEliece decryption operation as presented at DATE 2014. The presented cryptanalysis succeeds to recover the complete secret key after a few observed decryptions. It consists of a combination of a differential leakage analysis during the syndrome computation followed by an algebraic step that exploits the relation between the public and private key.
|Title of host publication||Applied Cryptography and Network Security|
|Editors||Tal Malkin, Vladimir Kolesnikov, Allison Bishop Lewko, Michalis Polychronakis|
|Number of pages||19|
|Publisher||Springer International Publishing|
|Publication status||Published - 09.01.2016|
|Event||13th International Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security - New York, United States|
Duration: 02.06.2015 → 05.06.2015