Co-location Detection on the Cloud

Mehmet Sinan Inci; Berk Gulmezoglu; Thomas Eisenbarth; Berk Sunar

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-43283-0_2

Co-location Detection on the Cloud

Mehmet Sinan Inci, Berk Gulmezoglu, Thomas Eisenbarth, Berk Sunar

Institute of IT-Security

Worcester Polytechnic Institute

Abstract

In this work we focus on the problem of co-location as a first step of conducting Cross-VM attacks such as Prime and Probe or Flush+Reload in commercial clouds. We demonstrate and compare three co-location detection methods namely, cooperative Last-Level Cache (LLC) covert channel, software profiling on the LLC and memory bus locking. We conduct our experiments on three commercial clouds, Amazon EC2, Google Compute Engine and Microsoft Azure. Finally, we show that both cooperative and non-cooperative co-location to specific targets on cloud is still possible on major cloud services.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design
Editors	François-Xavier Standaert, Elisabeth Oswald
Number of pages	16
Volume	9689
Publisher	Springer Verlag
Publication date	23.07.2016
Pages	19-34
ISBN (Print)	978-3-319-43282-3
ISBN (Electronic)	978-3-319-43283-0
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-43283-0_2
Publication status	Published - 23.07.2016
Event	7th International Workshop on Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design - Graz, Austria Duration: 14.04.2016 → 15.04.2016

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https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/284.pdf

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@inproceedings{0393eb50240044c7afae189e78c309bd,

title = "Co-location Detection on the Cloud",

abstract = "In this work we focus on the problem of co-location as a first step of conducting Cross-VM attacks such as Prime and Probe or Flush+Reload in commercial clouds. We demonstrate and compare three co-location detection methods namely, cooperative Last-Level Cache (LLC) covert channel, software profiling on the LLC and memory bus locking. We conduct our experiments on three commercial clouds, Amazon EC2, Google Compute Engine and Microsoft Azure. Finally, we show that both cooperative and non-cooperative co-location to specific targets on cloud is still possible on major cloud services.",

author = "Inci, {Mehmet Sinan} and Berk Gulmezoglu and Thomas Eisenbarth and Berk Sunar",

year = "2016",

month = jul,

day = "23",

doi = "10.1007/978-3-319-43283-0_2",

language = "English",

isbn = "978-3-319-43282-3",

volume = "9689",

series = "Lecture Notes in Computer Science",

publisher = "Springer Verlag",

pages = "19--34",

editor = "Standaert, {Fran{\c c}ois-Xavier } and Oswald, {Elisabeth }",

booktitle = "Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design",

note = "7th International Workshop on Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design, COSADE 2016 ; Conference date: 14-04-2016 Through 15-04-2016",

}

Inci, MS, Gulmezoglu, B, Eisenbarth, T & Sunar, B 2016, Co-location Detection on the Cloud. in F-X Standaert & E Oswald (eds), Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design. vol. 9689, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 9689, Springer Verlag, pp. 19-34, 7th International Workshop on Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design, Graz, Austria, 14.04.16. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-43283-0_2

Co-location Detection on the Cloud. / Inci, Mehmet Sinan; Gulmezoglu, Berk; Eisenbarth, Thomas et al.
Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design. ed. / François-Xavier Standaert; Elisabeth Oswald. Vol. 9689 Springer Verlag, 2016. p. 19-34 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science; Vol. 9689).

Research output: Chapters in Books/Reports/Conference Proceedings › Conference contribution › peer-review

TY - GEN

T1 - Co-location Detection on the Cloud

AU - Inci, Mehmet Sinan

AU - Gulmezoglu, Berk

AU - Eisenbarth, Thomas

AU - Sunar, Berk

PY - 2016/7/23

Y1 - 2016/7/23

N2 - In this work we focus on the problem of co-location as a first step of conducting Cross-VM attacks such as Prime and Probe or Flush+Reload in commercial clouds. We demonstrate and compare three co-location detection methods namely, cooperative Last-Level Cache (LLC) covert channel, software profiling on the LLC and memory bus locking. We conduct our experiments on three commercial clouds, Amazon EC2, Google Compute Engine and Microsoft Azure. Finally, we show that both cooperative and non-cooperative co-location to specific targets on cloud is still possible on major cloud services.

AB - In this work we focus on the problem of co-location as a first step of conducting Cross-VM attacks such as Prime and Probe or Flush+Reload in commercial clouds. We demonstrate and compare three co-location detection methods namely, cooperative Last-Level Cache (LLC) covert channel, software profiling on the LLC and memory bus locking. We conduct our experiments on three commercial clouds, Amazon EC2, Google Compute Engine and Microsoft Azure. Finally, we show that both cooperative and non-cooperative co-location to specific targets on cloud is still possible on major cloud services.

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-319-43283-0_2

DO - 10.1007/978-3-319-43283-0_2

M3 - Conference contribution

SN - 978-3-319-43282-3

VL - 9689

T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science

SP - 19

EP - 34

BT - Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design

A2 - Standaert, François-Xavier

A2 - Oswald, Elisabeth

PB - Springer Verlag

T2 - 7th International Workshop on Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design

Y2 - 14 April 2016 through 15 April 2016

ER -

Co-location Detection on the Cloud

Abstract

UN SDGs

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