Non-Linear Collision Analysis

Xin Ye, Cong Chen, Thomas Eisenbarth

Abstract

As an unsolved issue for embedded crypto solutions, side channel attacks are challenging the security of the Internet of things. Due to the advancement of chip technology, the nature of side channel leakage becomes hard to characterize with a fixed leakage model. In this work, a new non-linear collision attack is proposed in the pursuit of the side channel distinguishers with minimal assumption of leakage behavior. The attack relies on a weaker assumption than classical DPA: it does not require a specific leakage model. The mechanism of collision generation enables independent recovery of partial keys so that for the first time the collision attack can be fairly compared with other standard side channel distinguishers. The efficiency of this attack has been verified by experiments on an unprotected microcontroller implementation of AES. Its immunity to modeling errors is confirmed through simulation of a broad range of leakage functions.
OriginalspracheEnglisch
TitelRadio Frequency Identification: Security and Privacy Issues
Redakteure/-innenNitesh Saxena, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi
Seitenumfang17
Band8651
ErscheinungsortCham
Herausgeber (Verlag)Springer International Publishing
Erscheinungsdatum15.11.2014
Seiten198-214
ISBN (Print)978-3-319-13065-1
ISBN (elektronisch)978-3-319-13066-8
DOIs
PublikationsstatusVeröffentlicht - 15.11.2014
Veranstaltung10th International Workshop on Radio Frequency Identification: Security and Privacy Issues - Oxford, Großbritannien / Vereinigtes Königreich
Dauer: 21.07.201423.07.2014

Fingerprint

Untersuchen Sie die Forschungsthemen von „Non-Linear Collision Analysis“. Zusammen bilden sie einen einzigartigen Fingerprint.

Zitieren