Abstract
This paper proposes a new type of cache-collision timing attacks on software implementations of AES. Our major technique is of differential nature and is based on the internal cryptographic properties of AES, namely, on the MDS property of the linear code providing the diffusion matrix used in the MixColumns transform. It is a chosen-plaintext attack where pairs of AES executions are treated differentially. The method can be easily converted into a chosen-ciphertext attack. We also thoroughly study the physical behavior of cache memory enabling this attack.
Originalsprache | Englisch |
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Titel | Topics in Cryptology - CT-RSA 2010 |
Redakteure/-innen | Josef Pieprzyk |
Seitenumfang | 17 |
Band | 5985 |
Erscheinungsort | Berlin, Heidelberg |
Herausgeber (Verlag) | Springer Berlin Heidelberg |
Erscheinungsdatum | 03.2010 |
Seiten | 235-251 |
ISBN (Print) | 978-3-642-11924-8 |
ISBN (elektronisch) | 978-3-642-11925-5 |
DOIs | |
Publikationsstatus | Veröffentlicht - 03.2010 |
Veranstaltung | The Cryptographers’ Track at the RSA Conference 2010 - San Francisco, USA / Vereinigte Staaten Dauer: 01.03.2010 → 05.03.2010 |